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Historically the trustworthiness of a computer system was 
characterized by its reliability and availability. Later on safety 
was integrated into what is now termed dependability. System 
security was originally a concept that described the protection 
of information from intentional and hostile interaction. It has 
now been suggested that security should be treated as a 
dependability attribute, parallel to reliability, availability and 
safety, but the implications of this integration has not yet been 
fully realized. This paper presents a novel approach to security, 
intended to facilitate and improve this integration. This is 
accomplished by taking a dependability viewpoint on tradi-
tional security and interpreting it in terms of system behaviour 
and fault prevention. A modified security concept, comprising 
only fault prevention characteristics and a new behaviouristic 
concept, privacy, are defined. The outcome of this interpreta-
tion will influence the integration of the other three depend-
ability attributes.
Keywords: Computer System, Dependability, Security, Con-
cepts, Terminology.
1.  INTRODUCTION
The research field of security and dependability are two dis-
ciplines that describe important properties of computer sys-
tems. In short, security has emerged from the viewpoint of 
intentional and hostile interaction with a database system, so 
that unauthorized disclosure or modification of information 
results. Dependability has evolved from reliability and avail-
ability considerations. Security and dependability have tradi-
tionally been treated separately. Lately however, attempts have 
been made to integrate these two, e.g as suggested in [14], 
where dependability is defined as the overall concept of which 
security is just an attribute among others. However, the conse-
quences of this proposed integration have not yet been fully 
realized. What we are facing here is the classical problem of 
two successful disciplines that are both evolving, resulting in a 
situation where an overlap occurs.
Advocates for each discipline tend to incorporate the “other” 
into their “own” one without realizing the changes that such an 
integration would entail. The incorporation of security as a 
dependability attribute has already been mentioned. Similar 
attempts can be found within the security community [6]. 
Another point of concern is that the concepts overlap and that 
each discipline uses a set of viewpoints and a terminology that 
is often incompatible with that of the other discipline.The most 
striking example of overlap is availability. From the security 
viewpoint it describes the possible disruption of service deliv-
ery to the authorized user as a result of intentional interaction. 
However, from the reliability viewpoint the possible service 
disruption is normally due to a component failure, even if no 
restriction with respect to the cause is really made.
An illustration of a discrepancy in terminology is that in the 
dependability discipline reasons for failures are called faults, 
whereas security people talk about attacks that cause breaches. 
Whether these terms correspond directly is not clear, even if 
the similarity is evident. A lot of questions of this type could 
be posed. What are the relations between e.g. fault, attack, 
flaw, error, bug, vulnerability, defect? Do some of these terms 
represent identical concepts? Should we in that case look for 
unification of terminology, or is it justifiable to maintain sepa-
rate terminologies for each discipline? These are questions 
which need to be answered as integration work proceeds, and 
even though a full answer will not be given in this paper the 
suggestions made will considerably facilitate further work in 
this direction.
2.  PRESENT STATUS
This section gives the present status of the disciplines of 
dependability and security. There are many different opinions 
as to the status of discussion of the concepts and terminology 
used. The versions given below are believed to have a wide-
spread acceptance. Dependability is given in its ”classical” 
form with the traditional way of integrating security. Security 
is described by its different aspects and some alternatives are 
mentioned. It should be noted that there are two main security 
concepts. The first one is related to database systems and infor-
mation security. The second one can be related to any com-
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puter system or even any system at all and includes all types of 
security. The first concept can be seen as a subset of the sec-
ond.
2.1  Security and its aspects
The security of a computer system is normally understood as 
its ability to withstand illegal intentional interaction or attacks 
against system assets such as data, hardware or software. This 
notion of security normally assumes a hostile action from a 
person, the attacker, who often tries to gain some kind of per-
sonal benefit from his actions. Security is normally defined by 
three different aspects: confidentiality, integrity and availabil-
ity [8], [9], [14], [17].
Confidentiality, which is also called secrecy, is the ability of 
the computing system to prevent unauthorized access to sys-
tem assets, such as the disclosure of information to unauthor-
ized parties. Integrity is the ability of the computer system to 
prevent data or other assets from being modified, deleted or 
destroyed by an unauthorized party. Finally, availability, is the 
system’s ability to deliver its normal service to the authorized 
user, even in the presence of attacks. 
Various versions of the definition of security exist. Some 
authors add one or two extra aspects, such as denial-of-service
and authenticity, others prefer a different grouping, see e.g. 
[11], [15]. In database systems integrity refers to actions taken 
by an authorized party and to the accuracy and validity of data, 
whereas security refers to protection of data against unauthor-
ized interaction [5].
Finally, there exists a completely different security concept, 
which is mainly applicable for information or data security. 
This concept concentrates on the development procedure and 
defines security in formalistic terms as a method for enforce-
ment of a security policy for a company or organization. The 
security policy is understood as a set of laws, rules and prac-
tices that regulates how an organization manages, protects and 
distributes sensitive information [7], [9]. 
2.2  Dependability and its attributes
Dependability was first introduced as an extension of reli-
ability and availability and these were then reduced to be spe-
cific attributes of dependability together with safety and secu-
rity [13]. Reliability and availability constitute different views 
of a basic concept that deals with the delivery of service. Here, 
service is the system behaviour as perceived by its users [14]. 
Reliability is a characteristic that reflects the probability that 
the system will deliver its service under specified conditions 
for a stated period of time, whereas availability reflects the 
probability that the system will be available, or ready for use, 
at a certain instant in time. Availability describes the system in 
terms of the alternation between operating periods and periods 
of failure. Thus availability, as opposed to reliability, incorpo-
rates the fact that a system can be repaired.
At a later date the attribute of safety was added. Safety is also 
related to the service delivered by the system, but rather than 
characterizing the system during operation, it denotes the sys-
tem’s ability to fail in such a way that catastrophic conse-
quences are avoided. Safety is reliability with respect to cata-
strophic failures.
Finally it was suggested that security be incorporated as a 
fourth dependability attribute. It refers to the system’s ability 
to prevent unauthorized access and/or handling of information 
[14]. However, as we shall see in the following, security is a 
more complex concept than reliability and availability are, and 
some aspects of security clearly overlap already existing reli-
ability/availability aspects. Therefore, security integration into 
dependability calls for some adaptation of both concepts. 
3.  A SYSTEM MODEL FOR DEPENDABILITY
3.1  Background
In this section we shall define a simple system model aimed 
at illustrating some basic properties of dependable computer 
systems and which we shall then use to describe how security 
can be better integrated into dependability.
In general, there are two basic types of interaction between a 
system and its environment, see figure 1. First, the system 
affects the environment or is delivering an output to the envi-
ronment, which experiences the output as the system behav-
iour. 
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Figure 1: A system model for dependability
There is also an environmental influence on the system, 
which means that the system receives an input from the envi-
ronment. The input consists of many different types of interac-
tion. The type of interaction we are interested in here is inter-
action that involves a fault introduction into the system. Since 
faults are detrimental to the system, we seek to design the sys-
tem so that the introduction of faults is prevented: fault preven-
tion.
3.2  System behaviour and dependability
A closer look closer at the system behaviour will show that 
we need to distinguish between three different receivers of the 
output delivered by the system: the authorized user, the unau-
thorized user, and the rest of the environment of the system. 
See figure 2. The authorized users are the users that are the 
intended receivers of the service that the system delivers, as 
specified in the system specification. In the following we shall 
call the authorized user(s) the User. A user is any system in the 
environment that is a potential consumer of the output deliv-
ered by the system. It may be human or object: a person, a 
computer, a program etc. All potential users except the autho-RQR - 157 2
rized users are unauthorized users. Unauthorized users are 
called Non-users. The third receiver is the rest of the environ-
ment of the system, which we call Other environment. Thus, 
the environment consists of the Users, the Non-users and the 
Other environment.
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Figure 2: System dependability interaction with environment
We observe that dependability is defined as “the trustworthi-
ness of a computer system such that reliance can justifiably be 
placed on the service it delivers”, where the service is the sys-
tem behaviour as perceived by the user(s) [14]. In this defini-
tion it is understood, even if not explicitly stated, that the 
user(s) are the authorized user(s). Thus dependability is 
defined in terms of service delivery to the User. Nothing is said 
about delivery of service to Non-users or to the Other environ-
ment, nor about other types of output to the environment other 
than the specified service.
3.3  Fault introduction 
The receivers of the system output normally also create an 
input to the system. Thus they are potential sources for fault 
introduction: faults may originate from the User, the Non-user 
or the Other environment. See figure 2.
Here, the term fault is used in the sense of an event-type phe-
nomenon that leads to an error in the system and that may 
eventually result in unwanted system behaviour, i.e. a failure 
or security exposure. The faults considered here are external 
faults, the sources of which are found in the environment. 
External “classical” faults of all types, as well as security 
attacks, are included in this definition. A fault made by a User 
may be an accidental handling fault. An example of a Non-user 
fault is an intentional security violation. Ionizing radiation 
from other subsystems in the environment may also cause 
faults.
4.  UNDERSTANDING SECURITY IN DEPENDABILI-
TY TERMS.
4.1  Background
Given the system model for dependable systems in the previ-
ous section, we now ask ourselves how the traditional security 
concept could be readily interpreted in dependability terms. 
We shall see in the following that the three aspects, confiden-
tiality, integrity and availability are, to a large extent, already 
covered by existing concepts in the dependability discipline, 
either as a behaviouristic concept, i.e. related to the behaviour 
of the system, or as a preventive concept, i.e. related to the pre-
vention of faults from being introduced into the system.
4.2  Availability
Availability is primarily defined as the ability of the system 
to deliver its service to the User, i.e. a behaviouristic concept. 
Therefore, availability as a security aspect is clearly a subset of 
the availability concept in dependability. See figure 3.
Availability also includes the prevention of faults from being 
introduced by a Non-user, which would lead to a situation in 
which the service is no longer available to the user. This is a 
fault prevention issue with respect to intentional interaction 
faults made by the Non-user. Consequently, availability as a 
security aspect is completely covered by the corresponding 
dependability attribute.
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Figure 3: Understanding security in dependability terms
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4.3  Integrity
Integrity is the prevention of unauthorized modification, 
deletion or destruction of system assets. Integrity is violated by 
means of an attack, which is normally performed by a Non-RQR - 157 3
user, but may also be performed by a User who is abusing his 
authority. (Note that in database literature integrity is exclu-
sively related to User action.)
Thus, integrity is a preventive quality of a system and charac-
terizes the system’s ability to withstand attacks. If the preven-
tion is not successful, reduced availability would normally 
result. This preventive quality is built into the system, either 
technically and/or as a part of the regulatory mechanisms that 
protects the system. Thus, integrity describes some of the 
means for fault prevention that are available to a system. 
Therefore, integrity is also covered by well-known depend-
ability concepts. 
4.4  Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the ability of the system to prevent unau-
thorized access to system assets, i. e. restricting the availability 
of the service delivered by the system to the Non-users.
It is thus a behaviouristic concept which defines certain char-
acteristics of the system behaviour, but unlike other attributes 
it defines system behaviour with respect to a Non-user. It actu-
ally defines to what extent information and other assets should 
be accessible, or rather not accessible, to Non-users. There-
fore, the behaviouristic aspect of confidentiality can be 
regarded as a new attribute in the dependability discipline, par-
allel to reliability, availability and safety.
Sometimes, confidentiality also has a preventive meaning, 
i.e. how to prevent Non-user fault introduction that would e.g. 
lead to an unauthorized disclosure of information.
4.5  Security
In view of the discussion in the previous sections we suggest 
a modified definition of the security concept, so that security is 
simply regarded as a form of fault prevention, namely fault 
prevention with respect to intentional faults. Thus, security is 
a purely preventive concept, which is not at all related to the 
behaviour of the system but only to its ability to protect itself 
against certain types of faults and attacks. Consequently, secu-
rity mechanisms are fault prevention mechanisms and a secu-
rity policy informs about the security mechanisms that are 
needed in order to ensure an unimpaired system behaviour.
5.  MODIFIED DEPENDABILITY ATTRIBUTES
The preceding section suggested that the behaviouristic part 
of confidentiality should be defined as a separate dependability 
attribute that would describe the relation of the computer sys-
tem to the Non-user. One could discuss what word to use for 
this new attribute. In order to avoid confusion caused by terms 
already used in the traditional security context, such as e.g. 
“confidentiality” or even “security”, we have chosen to use the 
word privacy. The advantage of this word is that it includes 
meanings such as confidentiality and secrecy, which are appro-
priate for information privacy, but also the meaning seclusion, 
which could stand for privacy of assets such as hardware and 
software. See figure 4.
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Figure 4: Modified dependability attributes
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Reliability and availability, on the other hand, are both attri-
butes describing the relation of the computer system to the 
User. They could therefore be regarded as views on the same 
composite attribute: reliability/availability.
Where does that leave safety? With the proposed terminology 
safety could be expressed as the system’s ability to fail in such 
a way that unintended catastrophic consequences are avoided, 
whether those consequences would affect the User, Non-user, 
Other environment or the system itself. If we take the view-
point of the User and Non-user, safety could be regarded as a 
“sub-attribute” to either reliability/availability or privacy. This 
would mean that dependability would be understood in terms 
of only two attributes: reliability/availability (related to the 
User) and privacy (related to the Non-user), leaving safety to 
describe certain types of failures for both of these. However, 
due to the importance of safety properties and in order to 
clearly incorporate their possible impact on the system itself 
and on the Other environment, we have chosen to present 
safety as a separate attribute. See figure 5.RQR - 157 4
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Figure 5: Dependability attributes from a User’s viewpoint
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The modified definitions of dependability and its attributes 
can be summarized as follows:
reliability/availability: refers to the system’s ability of deliv-
ery-of-service to the authorized users, called Users.
privacy: refers to the system’s ability of denial-of-service to 
unauthorized users, called Non-users. All users but those 
explicitly specified as authorized users are Non-users.
safety: refers to the system’s ability to avoid unintended cata-
strophic consequences. These consequences may affect the 
environment, including Users, Non-users and the Other en-
vironment, or the system itself.
dependability: is the trustworthiness of a computer system
such that reliance can be justifiably placed on the service it 
delivers to its Users, on the privacy it maintains with re-
spect to its Non-users and on the absence of unintended cat-
astrophic consequences.
Unfortunately, in the definition of safety, the word “unin-
tended” has to be added since many systems are constructed to 
intentionally cause catastrophic consequences on the environ-
ment, an obvious example being warheads.
6.  CONCLUSIONS
A novel approach to the integration of security and depend-
ability has been proposed. It is based on the observation that 
the dependability of a computer system could be described in 
behaviouristic and preventive terms. A behaviouristic view-
point is related to the behaviour of the system, i.e. to how the 
system influences its environment. A preventive viewpoint 
describes the measures to be taken to prevent faults from being 
introduced into the system, i.e. how to prevent unwanted envi-
ronmental influence on the system.
Using this approach we have shown how the various aspects 
of traditional security could either be mapped onto existing 
dependability concepts or be understood as a new dependabil-
ity attribute, which we call privacy. The meaning of privacy is 
quite close to that of confidentiality, but includes only the 
behaviouristic part of it. Privacy is different from the existing 
dependability attributes in that it describes the system’s rela-
tion to an unauthorized user, whereas the composite reliability/
availability attribute describes the relation with the authorized 
user. Safety describes the system’s ability to avoid catastrophic 
failures whether reliability or privacy failures.
Security is redefined as a concept for fault prevention with 
respect to intentional external faults or attacks against the sys-
tem with no specific relation to behaviouristic attributes, such 
as privacy or reliability/availability.
7.  REFERENCES
[1] T. Anderson (editor): Safe & Secure Computing Sys-
tems, Blackwell Scientific Publications, ISBN 0-632-
01819-4, 1989.
[2] R. H. Baker: Computer Security Handbook, 2nd Edi-
tion, TAB Professional and Reference Books, 
McGraw-Hill Inc, ISBN 0-8306-7592-2, 1991.
[3] T. Beth, J. Dobson, D. Gollman, A Klar: “Security 
Evaluation Report: Concepts and Terminology,” EISS-
Universität Karslruhe / University of Newcastle upon 
Tyne, 1990.
[4] L. Blain, Y. Deswarte: “An Intrusion-tolerant Security 
Server for an open Distributed System,” LAAS report 
no 90085, March 1990, Toulouse, France.
[5] C. J. Date: An Introduction to Database Systems, vol. 
1, 5th edition, pp. 429ff. Addison-Wesley 1990, ISBN 
0-201-51381-1.
[6] D.E. Denning: “Secure Databases and Safety: Some 
unexpected conflicts,” pp. 101-111 in T. Anderson (ed-
itor): Safe & Secure Computing Systems, Blackwell 
Scientific Publications, ISBN 0-632-01819-4, 1989.
[7] Department of Defence: Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria (“orange book”), CSC-STD-001-
83.
[8] D. K. Hsiao: “Database Security Course Module,” pp. 
269-301 in Database Security: Status and Prospects, 
Elsevier Science Publishers B.V, Holland, IFIP WG 
11.3, ISBN 0-444- 70479-5, 1988
[9] Information Technology Security Evaluation Crite-
ria (ITSEC): Harmonized Criteria of France-Germa-
ny-the Netherlands-the United Kingdom, Draft 1990. 
Kollen-Druck Bonn.
[10] International Standards Organization: Data Pro-
cessing - Open Systems Interconnection - Basic Refer-
ence Model, ISO/IS 7498, Geneva 1983.
[11] International Standards Organization: Information 
processing systems - Open Systems Interconnection - 
Basic Reference Model, part 2: Security Architecture 
7498/2.
[12] M.K. Joseph: “Integration problems in Fault-tolerant, 
secure computer design,” pp. 347-364 in A.Avizienis. 
J.C. Laprie (editors): Dependable Computing for Criti-
cal Applications, Springer-Verlag, N.Y., ISBN 3-211-
82249-6, 1991.RQR - 157 5
[13] J.C. Laprie: “Dependable Computing and Fault Toler-
ance: Concepts and Terminology,” in Proc. 15th IEEE 
International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing 
(FTCS-15), June 1985.
[14] J.C. Laprie et al.: Dependability: Basic Concepts and 
Terminology, Springer-Verlag, ISBN 3-211-82296-8, 
1991.
[15] S. Muftic: Security Mechanisms for Computer Net-
works, Ellis Horwood Ltd, England, ISBN 0-7458-
0613-9, 1989.
[16] D. M. Nessett: “Factors Affecting Distributed System 
Security,” IEEE Symp. on Security & Privacy, 1986, 
pp. 204 - 222.
[17] C. P. Pfleeger: Security In Computing, Prentice Hall 
International, Inc. ISBN 0-13-799016-2, 1989.RQR - 157 6
